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1 Introduction
Social dilemmas, in which individuals must forego some personal benefit for
a collective benefit to be generated, are ubiquitous. An investor’s fear that
an entrepreneur will “take the money and run” may prevent enterprises from
being created. In bargaining situations, agreements may fail to materialize
because one party was offended by the offer by the other party. Absent en-
forceable contracts between the parties, or the threat of future punishments
such as in repeated games, the interacting parties’ ability to realize potential
mutual benefits depends to a large extent on the parties’ attitudes. In particu-
lar, mutual benefits typically fail to materialize if each party is selfish, but may
materialize if the parties have other-regarding preferences, such as altruism or
inequity aversion. Understanding the nature of preferences is thus crucial for
understanding behavior in social dilemmas.
While preferences such as altruism (Becker, 1974), warm glow (Andreoni,
1990), inequity aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000),
reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger,
2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006), and image concerns (Be´nabou & Tirole, 2006;
Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008) have received much attention in the behav-
ioral and experimental economics literature, moral concerns have been less
studied, although they may clearly matter in social dilemmas (Binmore, 1998).
We here contribute to filling this gap by reporting structurally estimated pref-
erence parameters of a general utility function that nests several much studied
preference classes, such as pure self-interest, altruism, spite (negative altru-
ism), and inequity aversion, as well as a form of Kantian morality, so called
Homo moralis preferences, which have been theoretically shown to have a strong
evolutionary foundation (Alger & Weibull, 2013; Alger, Weibull, & Lehmann,
2019). The data was collected in a laboratory experiment using a variety of
strategic interactions.
The laboratory experiment consists of letting each subject choose strategies
in three classes of two-player social dilemmas: sequential prisoners’ dilem-
mas, mini trust games, and mini ultimatum bargaining games. The subjects
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are randomly and anonymously matched. Each subject had to make multiple
decisions in each of 18 different games (six games in each game class). In or-
der to identify preferences in such strategic interactions, the analyst needs to
either hypothesize subjects’ beliefs about the behavior of their opponents (for
example by some equilibrium hypothesis) or else try to elicit each subject’s be-
lief in each strategic interaction. We have chosen the second route. The ability
to control for subjects’ beliefs when trying to identify their preferences is in-
deed crucial for the estimation of other-regarding preferences (see Miettinen,
Kosfeld, Fehr, and Weibull (2019) and references therein). Social image con-
cerns (Be´nabou & Tirole, 2006) are muted since subjects are anonymously and
randomly matched.
On the basis of observed individual choices and reported beliefs, we esti-
mate the preference parameter values for each individual subject. We do so
using a structural model, the use of which has become more commonplace
in experimental and behavioral economics, including the estimation of social
preferences (DellaVigna, 2018). For this purpose, we add idiosyncratic ran-
dom noise terms to the parametric utility function, thereby obtaining logistic
choice probabilities, and apply the maximum likelihood method. We also per-
form aggregate estimations, using a finite mixture approach, the same as that
used by Bruhin, Fehr, and Schunk (2018) in their statistical analysis of social
preferences.
Not surprisingly, we find a lot of heterogeneity. The standard deviations of
the estimated probability distributions for the parameters are in some cases as
much as three times the mean. While many subjects show aversion to unfa-
vorable inequity, some are either indifferent or positive or negative concerning
aversion to favorable inequity. Most subjects show some concern for Kantian
morality, and allowing for this motivational factor significantly improved the
fit of the model to the data. The representative agent in the subject pool places
about 70% weight on own payoff, about 13% weight on not falling behind the
opponent, and 17% weight on Kantian morality. Our finite mixture estima-
tions capture the heterogeneity in a tractable way. Models with two or three
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types provide a much better fit than the representative agent model. The two
types model has one type that combines inequity aversion with Kantian moral-
ity, while the other type combines “spite” or “competitiveness” – a dislike of
being behind and joy of being ahead – with Kantian morality. Importantly,
allowing for Kantian morality substantially improves the fit of the model. The
model selection criteria indeed favor models with Kantian morality over those
without. Moreover, the value added of Kantian morality is in the same ball-
park of such well-established motives as inequity aversion, altruism, and reci-
procity.
Closest to our work are probably the papers by Bruhin et al. (2018) and
Miettinen et al. (2019). The value added of the present study, in relation to
Bruhin et al. (2018), is two-fold; we allow for the possibility of Kantian moral-
ity as part of the motivation behind choices, and we study strategic interac-
tions (while they focus on allocation decisions for donors in dictator games and
for second-movers in reciprocity games). In relation to Miettinen et al. (2019),
the value added is four-fold: we study individual choices in 18 strategic inter-
actions (while they study one), we elicit individual risk attitudes (while they
assume risk neutrality), we make estimates of each subjects’ vector of taste
parameters, and we apply finite mixture methods.
More broadly speaking, our contribution fits in the large literature that
estimates or tests models of social preferences.1 In relation to this literature,
our main contribution is that we estimate a deontological motive, namely a
form of Kantian morality, in addition to social preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the class of preferences we estimate, Section 3 describes the experimental de-
sign, and Section 4 presents our econometric approach. The results are pre-
sented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
1See, for example, Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997); Andreoni and Miller (2002); Charness and
Rabin (2002); Engelmann and Strobel (2004); Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007); Bellemare,
Kro¨ger, and Van Soest (2008); Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2011); DellaVigna, List, and
Malmendier (2012); Ottoni-Wilhelm, Vesterlund, and Xie (2017) and, for a recent survey, see
Cooper and Kagel (2015).
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2 Social preferences and Kantian morality
We consider individual preferences such that each subject’s expected utility
can be written in the form
ui (x,y) = (1−κi) ·
∑
γ
η(x,y) (γ) ·pii (γ) (1)
−αi ·
∑
γ
η(x,y) (γ) ·max
{
0,piij (γ)−pii (γ)
}
−βi ·
∑
γ
η(x,y) (γ) ·max
{
0,pii (γ)−piij (γ)
}
+κi ·
∑
γ
η(x,x) (γ) ·pii (γ) ,
where x is the behavior strategy used by the subject at hand, i, and y the be-
havior strategy used by the subject j with whom i is matched. Each strategy
pair (x,y) determines the realization probability η(x,y) (γ) for each play γ of the
game protocol, where a play is a sequence of moves through the game tree,
from its “root” to one of its end nodes (see Figure 1). Because each subject
in our experiment faces risky decisions (the monetary payoff depends on the
decision of the opponent, which the subject does not know when making the
decisions), we allow for risk aversion. Thus, the term pii (γ) in equation (1) is
the Bernoulli function value that the individual attaches to his or her monetary
payoff under play γ . We will call pii (γ) the individual’s monetary utility under
play γ . If the monetary payoff allocation after a play γ is
(
mi (γ) ,mj (γ)
)
, we
assume that the individual’s own monetary utility is of the CRRA form
pii (γ) =
mi (γ)
1−ri − 1
1− ri , (2)
where ri is the (constant) degree of relative risk aversion of subject i. We fur-
ther assume that each subject evaluates his or her opponent’s monetary payoff
in terms of own risk attitude.2 Hence, subject i evaluates the opponent j’s
2There is experimental evidence that both students and financial professionals exhibit sub-
stantial such false consensus (Roth & Voskort, 2014). Moreover, there is experimental evi-
dence that people make the same decisions under risk (in the gain domain) for themselves
and others (Andersson, Holm, Tyran, & Wengstro¨m, 2014).
5
monetary payoff as follows:
piij (γ) =
mj (γ)
1−ri − 1
1− ri . (3)
Risk neutrality is the special case when ri = 0, and we identify the special case
ri = 1 with logarithmic utility for money: then pii (γ) = lnmi (γ) and piij (γ) =
lnmj (γ).
For any given degree of relative risk aversion, the family of utility functions
in (1) has three parameters. Two of them are the familiar measures of inequity
aversion. The parameter αi captures i’s disutility (if αi > 0) or utility (if αi < 0)
from disadvantageous inequity, i.e., from falling short in terms of monetary
payoffs in the interaction. Likewise, the parameter βi captures i’s disutility (if
βi > 0) or utility (if βi < 0) from advantageous inequity, i.e., from being ahead
in terms of monetary utility.
The third parameter, κi , captures a Kantian moral concern (a` la Homo
moralis, Alger & Weibull, 2013). It places weight on the expected monetary
utility that the subject would obtain if, hypothetically, both individuals were
to use the subject’s strategy x. Under this hypothesis, the probability that a
play γ would occur is η(x,x) (γ). In particular, a κi-value strictly between zero
and one represents a partly deontological motivation, an individual who, in
addition to the social concern that consists in caring about his or her own
monetary utility and that to the other individual in the interaction, is also mo-
tivated by what is the “right thing to do”, what strategy to use if it were also
used by other subjects. To choose a strategy x in order to maximize the last
term in (1) is to choose a strategy that maximizes monetary utility if used by
both subjects in a pairwise interaction (see Alger & Weibull, 2013, for a dis-
cussion).
The utility function in equation (1) nests many familiar utility functions
in the literature. Clearly, setting all three parameters to zero, αi = βi = κi = 0,
represents pure self-interest and thus amounts to the classical Homo oeconomi-
cus. The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion is obtained by
setting αi ≥ βi > 0 and κi = 0. In that model, individuals care about own mon-
6
etary utility and are also inequity averse. One obtains Becker’s (1974) model
of pure altruism by setting κi = 0 and αi = −βi , for some βi ∈ (0,1).3 Here βi is
the individual’s “degree of altruism”, the weight placed on the other subject’s
monetary utility, while the weight 1− βi is placed on own monetary utility.
Pure Homo moralis preferences are obtained by setting αi = βi = 0 and κi ∈
(0,1). Here κi is the individual’s “degree of Kantian morality”, the weight
placed on the monetary utility that would be obtained if both subjects in the
interaction at hand would use the same strategy, while the weight 1 − κi is
placed on own monetary utility.
The utility function in (1) also nests the Charness and Rabin (2002) model
without reciprocity. In Section 5.4 we extend the utility function to also ac-
commodate reciprocity as formalized in Charness and Rabin (2002).
3 Experimental design and procedures
3.1 Game protocols
In the experiment, subjects play three types of well-known game protocols,
illustrated in Figure 1: Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemmas (SPD), shown in Figure
1a, mini Trust Game protocols (TG), shown in Figure 1b, and mini Ultimatum
Game protocols (UG), shown in Figure 1c.4 We use the standard notation for
prisoners’ dilemmas, where R stands for “reward”, S for “sucker’s payoff”, T
for “temptation”, and P for “punishment”, and we throughout assume T > R >
P > S. Each subject plays 6 versions of each type of game protocol, for different
monetary payoff assignments T , R, P and S, see Table 1. 5
The term in the utility function in (1) that captures Kantian morality re-
3See also the note by Engelmann (2012) on extending inequity aversion models to incorpo-
rate altruism.
4By a “game protocol”, we mean a game tree and associated monetary payoffs.
5In the process of selecting the number of game protocols and the monetary payoffs, we
conducted simulations to verify if we could retrieve the original parameters. More details are
available upon request.
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Figure 1: Game protocols
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(R,R)
C
(S,T )
D
C
2
(T ,S)
C
(P ,P )
D
D
(a) Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma game protocol
1
2
(R,R)
G
(S,T )
K
I
(P ,P )
N
(b) Trust Game protocol
1
(R,R)
E
2
(T ,P )
A
(S,S)
F
U
(c) Ultimatum Game protocol
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Table 1: Game protocols: monetary payoffs
SPD protocols TG protocols UG protocols
No. T R P S No. T R P S No. T R P S
1 90 45 15 10 7 80 50 30 20 13 60 50 40 10
2 90 55 20 10 8 90 50 30 10 14 65 50 35 10
3 80 65 25 20 9 80 60 30 20 15 70 50 30 10
4 90 65 25 10 10 90 60 30 10 16 75 50 25 10
5 80 75 30 20 11 80 70 30 20 17 80 50 20 10
6 90 75 30 10 12 90 70 30 10 18 85 50 15 10
Notes: All payoffs denoted in the experimental currency (“points”), see Section
3.3 for details on payments.
quires that a strategy can “meet itself”, hence, that the interaction is symmet-
ric. To symmetrize the game protocols in Figure 1, which are clearly asym-
metric with one first-mover and one second-mover, we make it clear to the
subjects that they are equally likely to be drawn to play in each player role.
This defines a symmetric (meta) game protocol, in which “nature” first draws
the role assignment, with equal probability for both assignments, and then the
players learn their respective roles. A behavior strategy x therefore consists of
specifying (potentially randomized) choices at all decision nodes in the game
protocol. In the symmetrized SPD, each player thus has 8 pure strategies; in
the first-mover role to choose between “cooperate” (C) and “defect” (D), and
in the second-mover role to choose between C and D, both if the first-mover
played C and if the first-mover played D.
In the two other game protocols, each player likewise has 4 pure strategies:
a binary choice as first-mover, and a binary choice as second-mover. In the
TGs, for the first-mover role each subject selects between investing (I) or not
(N ). Each subject also specifies whether (s)he would like to give back some-
thing (G) or keep everything (K) if the first-mover invested. In the UGs each
subject specifies if (s)he would choose an equal (E) or an unequal (U ) division
in the first-mover role, and whether (s)he would accept (A) or refuse (F) an
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unequal proposal.
3.2 Distinguishing Kantian morality from social preferences
Many experimental studies use dictator game protocols to estimate social pref-
erences. An advantage of such protocols is that they contain no strategic ele-
ment, and hence there is no need to elicit subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’
behaviors. However, this class of game protocols would not allow us to distin-
guish between social preferences and Kantian morality. To see why, consider
a dictator game in which the donor may transfer any part of his endowment
w to the recipient, and the amount transferred will be multiplied by a fac-
tor m > 1. Suppose that both players face an equal probability of being the
donor, and denote by x ∈ [0,w] and y ∈ [0,w] their respective strategies (how
much to give in the donor role). Consider first a risk-neutral pure altruist i,
with βi = −αi ≥ κi = 0, and thus a utility function of the form (the factor 1/2
represents nature’s draw of roles):
ui (x,y) =
1
2
[(1− βi)(w − x+my) + βi(mx+w − y)] . (4)
If instead i is a risk-neutral pure Homo moralis, with κi ≥ αi = βi = 0, then his
or her expected utility is:
ui (x,y) =
1
2
[(1−κi)(w − x+my) +κi(mx+w − x)] . (5)
Comparing the second terms in these utility functions one sees that if i is an
altruist, then i cares about the other individual’s monetary payoff (mx +w −
y)/2 (which depends on the other’s strategy y), while if i is driven by Kantian
morality (s)he does not care about the other’s monetary payoff, but instead
cares about the monetary payoff (mx + w − x)/2, which would result if both
players were to use i’s strategy x.
However, this induces identical trade-offs for altruists and Kantian moral-
ists, as shown by the derivatives with respect to own strategy x:
dui(x,y)
dx
=
1
2
[βim− (1− βi)] , (6)
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and
dui(x,y)
dx
=
1
2
(κim− 1) . (7)
Hence, for generic parameter values, whether an altruist or a Kantian moralist,
the individual either gives the whole endowment or nothing at all (this is due
to the assumed risk neutrality). Moreover, dividing the right-hand side of (6)
by 1 − βi , and letting σi ≡ βi1−βi , we see that the altruist gives everything if σi
exceeds 1/m while the Kantian moralist gives everything if κi exceeds 1/m.6
Therefore, we would be unable to separate altruism from a Kantian concern
using dictator games.7
By contrast, by using game protocols that contain strategic elements and
collecting data on decisions at all nodes in the game tree as well as beliefs
about opponent’s play, our experimental design allows us to discriminate be-
tween social and Kantian moral preferences. To see this, consider the Ultima-
tum Game protocol, as in Figure 1c. When symmetrically randomized, in this
game a behavior strategy is a vector, x = (x1,x2) ∈ [0,1]2, where x1 is the proba-
bility with which the player proposes an equal sharing, and x2 the probability
with which he accepts an unequal sharing. Then a risk-neutral subject i ob-
tains the following expected utility from playing x = (x1,x2) when he believes
that the opponent will play yˆ = (yˆ1, yˆ2) (the randomization factor 1/2 has been
6This observation is in line with a more general comparison of behavioral predictions for
altruists and Kantian moralists in Alger and Weibull (2013), see also Alger and Weibull (2017).
7Many experiments use allocation tasks of the following sort. Consider a subject i who
faces the choice between the allocations (S,T ) and (P ,P ), where the first entry is monetary
payoff to self and the second entry is monetary payoff to the other subject, with T > P > S. It
can be verified that a risk-neutral subject i with a utility function of the form in (1) strictly
prefers (S,T ) to (P ,P ) if and only if κi(T − P )−αi(T − S) > P − S. Hence, a subject who selects
(S,T ) can be driven either by pure altruism (−αi > 0 = κi), by pure Kantian morality (κi >
0 = αi), by a combination of these, or by a combination of behindness aversion and Kantian
morality (αi ·κi > 0).
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omitted):
ui (x, yˆ) = (1−κi)[x1R+ (1− x1) yˆ2T + (1− x1) (1− yˆ2)S (8)
+ yˆ1R+ (1− yˆ1)x2P + (1− yˆ1) (1− x2)S]
− [αi (1− yˆ1)x2 + βi (1− x1) yˆ2] (T − P )
+κi[x1R+ (1− x1)x2T + (1− x1) (1− x2)S
+ x1R+ (1− x1)x2P + (1− x1) (1− x2)S].
The partial derivatives with respect to x1 and x2 are thus:
∂ui (x, yˆ)
∂x1
= (1−κi)[R− yˆ2T − (1− yˆ2)S] + βi · yˆ2 (T − P ) (9)
+κi · [2(R− S)− x2 (T + P − 2S)]
∂ui (x, yˆ)
∂x2
= (1−κi) (1− yˆ1) (P − S)−αi · (1− yˆ1) (T − P ) +κi · (1− x1) (T + P − 2S) .
(10)
These expressions reveal the key difference between an individual who is in-
equity averse but does not have a Kantian concern (κi = 0), to one who has
a Kantian concern but is not inequity averse (αi = βi = 0). When consider-
ing the effect of his choice as a first-mover, x1, the inequity-averse individual
pays no attention to his choice as a second-mover, while the Kantian moralist
does (i.e., x2 shows up in the derivative if and only if κi , 0). Likewise, when
considering the effect of his choice as a second-mover, x2, the inequity-averse
individual pays no attention to his choice as a first-mover, while the Kantian
moralist does (i.e., x1 shows up in (10) if κi , 0). The expressions (9) and
(10) further show that estimation of the preference parameters requires infor-
mation of the subjects’ beliefs about the opponent’s play information that we
elicit from the subjects.
While we provide an equally detailed analysis of the other two game pro-
tocols in Appendix A1, here we discuss the effect of Kantian morality in these
protocols in the light of simple examples. First, consider a Trust Game proto-
col (see Figure 1b) with 2R > T + S, and suppose that an individual i believes
that the opponent will play K (“keep”) as second-mover. If this individual i
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has no Kantian morality and is either selfish or driven by behindness aversion
(αi > 0), he will choose N (“not invest”) as first-mover. By contrast, if he has
Kantian morality of a sufficiently large degree κi , then he will, as first-mover,
choose I (“invest”), because he would himself play G (“give back”) as second
mover.
Likewise, in the symmetrically randomized Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma
protocol (Figure 1a), suppose that 2R > T + S > 2P and consider a subject who
believes that the other will choose D both as first-mover and as second-mover.
Despite this belief, a subject i with a large enough degree of Kantian morality
would nevertheless evaluate the play C followed by C, because this is the play
he would choose if he met himself. In other words, the first-mover choice
by an individual with a Kantian moral concern is not only influenced by his
belief about the opponent’s actual play, but also by what he would himself
have done as second-mover at all nodes (information that we collect in the
experiment). This example highlights an important consequence of Kantian
morality: a subject’s preferences over moves off the path of a strategy pair
(x,y) may influence his or her decisions on its path. This differs sharply from
altruism, inequity aversion or spite, since such individual’s first-mover choice
depends only on her belief about her opponent’s ensuing second-mover choice.
Clearly, disentangling an individual’s social preferences from his or her
Kantian moral preferences requires controlling for his or her beliefs about
the opponent’s play. We therefore elicit subjects’ such beliefs (by way of the
quadratic scoring rule). We describe the experimental procedures, including
the belief elicitation procedure, in the next subsection.
3.3 Procedures
In total, 136 subjects (69 men, 67 women) participated in the experiment. We
conducted 8 sessions at the CentERlab of Tilburg University, with between 12
and 22 subjects per session. Using the strategy method, each subject made
decisions both as a first mover and a second mover for 18 game protocols (6
SPDs, 6 TGs and 6 UGs). Each of the game protocols had different monetary
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payoffs, which are listed in Table 1. All payoffs are denoted in ‘points’, where
one point is equivalent to 17 eurocents. The order of the game protocols was
randomly determined at the beginning of each session. For each game pro-
tocol, subjects first indicated what they would do at each decision node and
second what they believed others would do at each decision node. In all game
protocols, we used neutral labels. Two of the 18 game protocols were ran-
domly selected for payment. For one game protocol, subjects were paid based
on their actions and for the second game protocol they were paid based on
the accuracy of their beliefs. For the payment based on actions, subjects were
randomly matched in pairs and randomly assigned the role of first-mover or
second-mover. Based on the actions in a pair, earnings for both subjects in the
pair were calculated. For the payment based on beliefs, one decision node was
randomly selected and subjects were paid using a quadratic scoring rule.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned a cu-
bicle and read the instructions on-screen at their own pace. Subjects also re-
ceived a printed summary of the instructions. At the end of the instructions
subjects had to successfully complete a quiz to test their understanding of the
instructions before they could continue. After completing the game protocols,
we elicited risk attitudes using an incentivized method similar to the method
of Eckel and Grossman (2002). Self-reported demographic data was gathered
by way of asking the subjects to complete a short questionnaire at the end of
the session. The instructions, quiz questions and risk elicitation task are re-
produced in Appendix A3. Sessions took around 1 hour and subjects earned
between e10.50 and e26.90 with an average of e18.80. The experimental de-
sign and main analyses were pre-registered.8
4 Statistical analysis
The econometric strategy consists in producing both individual and aggre-
gate estimates of the parameters in the utility function specified in (1). In
8See https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=4u5nu8.
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the statistical data analysis to follow we will add yet another term to the ex-
pression in (1), an idiosyncratic random variable that we take to be Gumbel
distributed. Assuming that all such “noise” terms are statistically indepen-
dent with the same mode, and with a subject-specific variance, this render
all subject’s choice probabilities on the familiar logit form (McFadden, 1974),
each with a subject-specific noise parameter. When analyzing the choice data
in terms of this random utility model, we will use the subjects’ stated beliefs
about other subjects’ strategy choice. Hence, no equilibrium assumption is
imposed.
4.1 Individual preferences
For each subject i, we estimate the individual’s social and moral preference
parameters αi , βi , and κi as specified in (1), using a standard additive error
specification. We refer to these preference parameters using the vector θi =
(αi ,βi ,κi). For each individual, we infer the risk parameter ri from the lottery
choices in the Eckel and Grossman (2002) task. As a robustness check, we also
carry out the analysis under the alternative assumption that all subjects are
risk neutral (all ri = 0), see Section 5.3. We consider pure strategies (that is,
assigning a unique action at each decision node), and assume that subject i’s
true (expected) utility from using pure strategy xi when yˆi is i’s expectation
about his opponents behavior, is a random variable of the additive form
u˜i(xi , yˆi ,θi) = ui(xi , yˆi ,θi) + εixi ,
where ui(xi , yˆi ,θi) is the expected utility of using strategy xi given beliefs yˆi fol-
lowing from the utility function in (1), and εixi is a random variable represent-
ing idiosyncratic tastes not picked up by the hypothesized utility ui(xi , yˆi ,θi).
Such a random utility specification sometimes induces choice of actions that
do not maximize the deterministic component ui(xi , yˆi ,θi). Assuming that the
noise terms εixi are statistically independent (between subjects and across pure
behavior strategies xi for each subject) and Gumbel distributed with the same
variance, the probability that subject i will use strategy xi , given his proba-
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bilistic belief yˆi about the opponent’s play is given by the familiar logit formula
(McFadden, 1974):
pi (xi , yˆi ,θi ,λi) =
exp[(ui(xi , yˆi ,θi)) /λi]∑
x′∈Xg exp[(ui(x′, yˆi ,θi)) /λi]
, (11)
where λi > 0 is a “noise” parameter, which is estimated alongside the pref-
erence parameters in θi , and Xg denotes the set of pure strategies in game
protocol g. The smaller the parameter λi is, the higher is the probability that
individual i makes his or her choices according to the hypothesized utility
function ui(xi , yˆi ,θi). We use maximum likelihood to estimate the preference
parameter vector θi = (αi ,βi ,κi) and the “noise” parameter λi for each individ-
ual i. Then, the probability density function can be written as:
f (xi , yˆi ,θi ,λi) =
∏
g∈G
∏
x∈Xg
pi (x, yˆi ,θi ,λi)
I(i,g,x) , (12)
where xi is the vector of the observed pure strategies of individual i, yˆi is
the vector of stated beliefs of individual i about opponent’s strategy in all the
game protocols, and I(i,g,x) is an indicator function that equals 1 if i played
strategy x in game protocol g and 0 otherwise.
4.2 Aggregate estimations
We estimate preference parameters both for a representative agent and a given
number of “preference types”. For the representative agent, we simply ag-
gregate all individual decisions and treat them as if they come from a single
decision-maker. For the types estimations, we use finite mixture models, sim-
ilar to the approach used by Bruhin et al. (2018). The finite mixture estima-
tions allow us to capture heterogeneity in the population in a tractable way.
For these estimations, we assume that there is a given number of types K in
the population. For each type k = {1, ...,K}, we estimate the parameter vec-
tor θk = (αk ,βk ,κk), the CRRA parameter rk, and the noise parameter λk. The
log-likelihood is given by:
lnL =
N∑
i=1
ln
 K∑
k=1
φk · f (xi , yˆi ,θk , rk ,λk)
 , (13)
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where φk is the population share of type k in the population. To maximize the
log-likelihood in (13), we use an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm
(see for instance McLachlan, Lee, & Rathnayake, 2019). As part of the EM
algorithm, we estimate the posterior probabilities τi,k that individual i belongs
to type k by:
τi,k =
φk · f (xi , yˆi ,θk , rk ,λk)∑K
m=1φm · f (xi , yˆi ,θm, rm,λm)
. (14)
5 Results
5.1 Individual preferences
Figure 2 shows the marginal distributions of the estimated individual prefer-
ence parameters αi , βi , and κi .9 For all three parameters, we observe consider-
able heterogeneity. Most estimates of αi and κi are positive and signed-ranks
tests confirm that the parameter distributions are located to the right of zero
(p < 0.001 for both αi and κi estimates). By contrast, most estimates of βi are
negative, and this is again confirmed by a signed-rank test (p = 0.003). Hence,
we find that most subjects are motivated by a combination of Kantian morality
(κi > 0) and spite (αi > 0,βi < 0).
The distributions in Figure 2 indicate that there is substantial heterogene-
ity in social preferences and Kantian morality concerns. For most subjects, the
parameter estimates are of reasonable size. Indeed, mean and median esti-
mates for the three parameters have absolute values below one half. However,
for some subjects we obtain very large estimates of αi , βi , and/or κi (in abso-
lute value). In the remainder of this section, we report results for our ‘core
sample’, which consists of the 109 subjects for whom all three preference pa-
rameter estimates lie between -2 and 2. In Appendix A2 we report results
based on data for all 136 subjects. While the latter results are more noisy, they
are qualitatively quite similar to those for the core sample.
9In Table A.1 in Appendix A2, we present an overview of the actions and beliefs for each
game protocol. Table A.2 in Appendix A2 presents all decisions in the risk elicitation task.
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Figure 2: Distributions of individual parameter estimates
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Note: All estimates of αi , βi and κi larger than 2 in absolute value are grouped
in bins (“<” and “>”) at the extremes of the horizontal axis. Figure based on all
136 subjects.
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Table 2: Individual parameter estimates
Parameter Median Mean S.D. Min Max
αi 0.14 0.19 0.38 −0.89 1.75
βi -0.06 −0.14 0.51 −1.97 1.37
κi 0.18 0.24 0.22 −0.10 1.10
Notes: Table based on the 109 subjects for whom the αi , βi and κi estimates
have absolute value below 2. Table A.3 shows a similar table based on all 136
subjects.
Table 2, which shows summary statistics for the parameter estimates, pro-
vides further support for the pattern observed in Figure 2. Median and mean
estimates are positive for αi and κi , but negative for βi . Moreover, the rel-
atively large standard deviations indicate that there is considerable hetero-
geneity in social preferences and Kantian morality. 10
Figure 3 illustrates the pairwise correlations between the three preference
parameter estimates. The left panel of Figure 3 shows that the estimates for
αi and βi are negatively correlated (Spearman’s ρ = 0.295, p = 0.002, n = 109),
and again that there is substantial heterogeneity. For many individuals we
observe a combination of αi > 0 and βi < 0, in line with spiteful/competitive
preferences, i.e., an individual dislikes being behind but likes being ahead of
the other. The middle panel of Figure 3 reveals a strong and positive correla-
tion between αi and κi estimates (Spearman’s ρ = 0.423, p < 0.001, n = 109).
This means that many individuals combine a distaste for disadvantageous in-
equity, or, as Bruhin et al. (2018) call it, “behindness aversion,” with Kantian
10For these estimates we used the risk elicitation task to determine ri . However, as a ro-
bustness test we also estimate ri alongside the preference parameters (αi , βi , κi). Doing so
does not affect the estimates by much. The estimated preference parameters are strongly cor-
related (Spearman rank correlations: ρ = 0.639,p < 0.001, n = 109 for αi , ρ = 0.566,p < 0.001,
n = 109 for βi , and ρ = 0.606,p < 0.001 for κi) although the correlation between the imposed
and estimated ri values is weak (ρ = 0.069,p = 0.478). The estimates of αi , βi and κi are not
systematically smaller or larger using either method (signed-rank tests, p = 0.198, n = 109 for
αi , p = 0.228, n = 109 for βi , and p = 0.388, n = 109 for κi).
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Figure 3: Correlations between estimated preference parameters.
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Notes: Each dot represents one subject. Dotted lines indicate linear predictions
(intercept+slope). Specifically, we estimate βi = −0.05−0.44αi , κi = 0.19+0.28αi
and κi = 0.22−0.11βi . Figure based on the 109 subjects for whom the αi , βi and
κi estimates have absolute value below 2.
morality. For the estimates of βi and κi we find a negative correlation (Spear-
man’s ρ = −0.173, p = 0.071, n = 109).
5.2 Aggregate estimations
Table 3 presents the estimates of the finite mixture models for one, two and
three types. In each of the models, we assume that there is a fixed number
of “preference types” in the population and we estimate parameters for each
type, where individuals are endogenously assigned to one of the types (see
section 4.2 for details). To distinguish these estimates from the individual
ones, we use an index k to designate the type.
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Table 3: Estimates at the aggregate level
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
αk 0.15 0.07 0.28 0.06 0.11 0.28
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
βk 0.03 0.13 −0.34 0.11 0.19 −0.37
(0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.12) (0.07) (0.14)
κk 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.20
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
λk 0.37 0.44 0.12 2.74 0.10 0.11
(0.11) (0.20) (0.06) (0.44) (0.07) (0.07)
rk 0.88 0.86 1.07 0.33 1.26 1.14
(0.09) (0.12) (0.29) (0.27) (0.21) (0.25)
φk 1.00 0.63 0.37 0.30 0.31 0.39
(-) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
lnL -2335.1 -2152.5 -2122.4
EN (τ ) 0.00 4.17 14.80
ICL 4693.6 4360.8 4339.3
NEC - 0.023 0.070
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Table A.4 in Appendix A2 shows the
estimates of a 4-type model. Table based on our ‘core sample’ of 109 subjects.
Table A.5 in Appendix A2 shows estimates based on the full sample.
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When assuming only one type, that is, a representative agent, we obtain
the estimates α0 = 0.15, β0 = 0.03, and κ0 = 0.19, where the index 0 stands
for the representative agent. In other words, the representative agent dislikes
disadvantageous inequity, is virtually indifferent with respect to advantageous
inequality, and has a positive degree of Kantian morality. Moreover, the rep-
resentative agent’s degree of risk aversion is estimated to be r0 = 0.88. We note
that if we approximate r0 to be 1, then the monetary utility becomes logarith-
mic, which permits the expected utility in (1) for an individual i to be written
in the following form:
ui (x,y) = Eη(x,y) [vi (γ)] + κ0Eη(x,x) [lnmi (γ)] , (15)
where
vi (γ) = (1−κ0) lnmi (γ)+α0 ln
(
min
{
1,
mi (γ)
mj (γ)
})
+β0 ln
(
min
{
1,
mj (γ)
mi (γ)
})
. (16)
The Bernoulli function value vi (γ) has the form of a Cobb-Douglas function.
It attaches weight to each of three “goods”; own monetary payoff, the ratio
between own monetary payoff and that of the opponent, when behind, and
between the opponent’s and own monetary payoff when ahead. According
to our estimates, it is thus as if the representative agent places roughly 70%
weight on the utility of own payoff, about 13% weight on behindness aversion,
no weight on being ahead, and roughly 17% weight on the Kantian morality.11
These individuals thus exhibit Kantian morality and behindness aversion.
As can be seen in Table 3, in the two multi-type models all types exhibit,
like the representative agent, both behindness aversion (αk > 0) and Kantian
morality (κk > 0), the latter being of the same order of magnitude as the repre-
sentative agent. Unlike the representative agent, however, none of the types in
these models is indifferent to the other’s monetary utility when ahead: while
some types dislike being ahead, other types like it.
More specifically, when assuming two types, the most common type (Type
1) exhibits inequity aversion, with parameter estimates α1 = 0.07 and β1 =
11More precisely, normalizing to unity the sum of the coefficients in front of the four loga-
rithmic terms in (15) and (16), one obtains (1−κ0)/ ((1−κ0) +α0 + β0 +κ0) = 0.70 etc.
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0.13, and a degree of Kantian morality κ1 = 0.21. This type’s risk aversion is
close to that of the representative agent (r1 = 0.86), but the behindness aver-
sion is weaker, and, unlike the representative agent, this type also dislikes
advantageous inequality. Hence, this type combines inequity aversion with
Kantian morality. This type represents about 63% of the subjects. The other
type, Type 2, exhibits a combination of strong spite (“negative altruism”) and
Kantian morality, with α2 = 0.28, β2 = −0.34, and κ2 = 0.19. With r2 = 1.07,
this type is similar in terms of risk aversion to the other type. While social
preferences and Kantian morality thus play major roles for both types, their
main concern is their own monetary utility. In this sense, pure self-interest
is still the main driver. The finding that a sizeable share of the subjects (here
37%) are both spiteful (αk > 0 and βk < 0) and moral (κk > 0) agrees with a
recent theoretical result that preference evolution in some settings leads to a
combination of self-interest, spite and Kantian morality (see Alger et al., 2019).
When assuming three types, for all types we again estimate a positive Kan-
tian morality parameter κk. In comparison with the results under the two-
types approach, Type 3 is very close to the previous Type 2. This type is again
characterized as combining spite with Kantian morality, and represents a sim-
ilar fraction of the population (39%). The new Type 2 (31%) is close to the
previous Type 1, combining inequity aversion with (relatively strong) Kantian
morality. It represents around 31% of the population. Type 1 is very close to
Homo moralis. It combines slight inequity aversion (α1 and β1 are not signif-
icantly different from zero at the 5% level), with Kantian morality. Note that
Type 1 is also less risk averse than the other types. In sum: under the three-
types approach, Type 1 displays Kantian morality, Type 2 is inequity averse
and moral, and Type 3 is spiteful and moral. Again, pure self-interest remains
the main motive behind choices. Note that we do not observe types who are
best described by pure self-interest. This is in line with the findings by Bruhin
et al. (2018). Importantly, we observe relatively little heterogeneity in esti-
mates of the morality parameter κk. In all cases, κk is around 0.2, showing
that most people are well described by having Kantian morality concerns.
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Clearly, adding more types improves the fit of the model, but this comes
at the cost of parsimony as well as precision of allocating individuals to types.
Information criteria like the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) are not well
suited to select the number of clusters (or in our case, ‘types’) in finite mix-
ture models (McLachlan et al., 2019). In a recent overview paper on the use
of finite mixture models, McLachlan et al. (2019) recommend using the ‘in-
tegrated completed likelihood’ (or ‘integrated classification’, ICL, Biernacki,
Celeux, & Govaert, 2000). This criterion is approximated by
ICL = −2lnL+ d lnN +EN (τ ), (17)
where the log-likelihood function lnL is defined as in (13), d is the number of
estimated parameters, and N is the number of individuals on our sample. The
last term in (17) is the entropy
EN (τ ) = −
K∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
τi,k lnτi,k , (18)
where τi,k is the estimated posterior probability of individual i belonging to
type k, as defined in (14). This implies that the stronger individuals are as-
signed to types (i.e. all τi,k’s close to zero or one), the lower the entropy will
be. In other words, the ICL extends the BIC by adding an additional penalty
if individuals are assigned imprecisely to types.
Bruhin et al. (2018) use the ‘normalized entropy criterion’ (NEC, Celeux &
Soromenho, 1996), which is defined as:
NEC =
EN (τ )
lnL(K)− lnL(1) , (19)
where lnL(1) is the log-likelihood of the representative agent model and lnL(K)
the log-likelihood of the model with K types. Hence, the NEC weighs the
precision of the type classifications τi,k by the increase in the log-likelihood
compared to the representative agent model.
Table 3 shows statistics for both the ICL and the NEC. For both metrics,
a lower score indicates a more preferred model. The NEC selects the 2-types
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model and the ICL selects the 3-types model. Table A.4 in Appendix A2 shows
estimates and goodness-of-fit metrics for a 4-types model. The 4-types model
has a higher NEC and a (slightly) lower ICL than the 2-types and 3-types mod-
els in 3. Note that marginal improvement in the ICL score is largest when
going from the representative agent to the 2-types model. So, assuming two
types instead of a representative agent brings us a long way in capturing the
heterogeneity in the population.
5.3 Risk neutrality
In the main analysis, we estimated the parameters in the expected utility func-
tion (1) with monetary utilities of the CRRA form as in (2) and (3), for pre-
estimated degrees of risk aversion. As a robustness check, we also estimate
the parameters in (1) under the alternative assumption that all subjects are
risk neutral (i.e., ri = 0 for all subjects i).
Figure 4 shows scatter plots of individual parameter estimates under both
assumptions, with estimates under risk neutrality on the horizontal axis and
estimates under constant (individual specific) relative risk aversion (CRRA) on
the vertical axis. Each dot represents an individual subject. The diagrams sug-
gest that the risk-neutral and CRRA estimates are strongly correlated. Indeed,
for the inequity parameter αi (when behind) the Spearman rank correlation is
ρ = 0.802. For the inequity parameter βi (when ahead) it is ρ = 0.774, and for
the Kantian morality parameter κi it is ρ = 0.627 (all three rank correlations
hold for p < 0.001, n = 109).
The middle panel in Figure 4 also shows that the βi estimates are much
higher under risk neutrality than under CRRA. Indeed, for 94 out of 109 sub-
jects, the risk-neutral estimate is lower than the CRRA estimate (signed-rank
test, p < 0.001).12 By contrast, the risk-neutral estimates of κi (80 out of 109,
signed-rank test: p < 0.001) and αi (64 out of 109, signed-rank test: p = 0.068)
12Moreover, for most subjects (80 out of 109), βi is positive under risk neutrality (signed-
rank test, p < 0.001).
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Figure 4: Correlations between risk neutral and CRRA estimates
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Notes: Figures shows estimates smaller than 2 in absolute value. Dotted lines
indicate 45 degree lines. Figure based on our ‘core sample’ of 109 subjects.
are lower for most subjects than under CRRA.13 For the majority of subjects
(72 out of 109), assuming CRRA preferences instead of risk neutrality leads to
a higher log-likelihood, indeed indicating a better fit under CRRA preferences.
Table 4 shows the estimates of finite mixture models under risk neutrality.
Comparing these results with those in Table 3, one sees that the estimates of
the parameters αk and κk are not much affected. For all types in Tables 3 and 4,
αk and κk are positive, under both risk hypotheses, with the Kantian morality
parameter values somewhat lower under risk neutrality than under CRRA. In
line with the individual parameter estimates, the finite mixture estimates of
the parameters β tend to be much higher under risk neutrality than under
CRRA. Moreover, under risk-neutrality, all estimates of βk are non-negative,
in contrast to the CRRA estimates, where we observed βk < 0 for some types
k.14
13Most risk-neutral estimates of κi (96 out of 109) and αi (92 out of 109) are positive (signed-
rank tests, p < 0.001)
14One can easily see how assuming risk neutrality would bias estimates of βk . Take for
example the UG protocol. Both risk aversion and ‘aheadness aversion’ (βi > 0) would induce
one to choose E over U .
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Table 4: Estimates at the aggregate level (assuming risk neutrality)
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
αk 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
βk 0.25 0.00 0.36 0.26 0.00 0.50
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07)
κk 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.14
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05)
λk 7.62 4.01 8.98 9.29 3.79 6.92
(0.60) (0.51) (0.95) (1.17) (0.36) (0.79)
φk 1.00 0.36 0.64 0.48 0.34 0.18
(-) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
lnL -2426.8 -2247.6 -2217.9
EN (τ ) 0.00 5.31 14.20
ICL 4872.5 4542.7 4515.6
NEC - 0.030 0.068
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Table based on our ‘core sample’ of 109
subjects.
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The ICL criterion allows comparison of the fit of the CRRA and risk-neutral
models, respectively (see Tables 3 and 4). For any given number of types, the
CRRA model has a lower ICL score than the risk-neutral model. For the 3-
types model, for example, the ICL score under the CRRA assumption is quite
a bit lower than under risk neutrality (4339.3 versus 4515.6), showing that the
CRRA model considerably improves the fit over the risk-neutrality model.
5.4 The value added of Kantian morality
In the preceding sections, we showed that estimated Kantian morality param-
eters tend to be positive, both at the individual and aggregate level. In this
subsection, we benchmark the added value of the Kantian morality parameter
against other parameters, and also against reciprocity.
5.4.1 Individual estimations
We conduct likelihood-ratio tests to see if adding the Kantian morality param-
eter κi to a model with only the two social preference parameters αi and βi
improves the fit. The likelihood-ratio tests reveal that adding κi improves the
fit for 21 individuals at the 5% level (and for 32 individuals at the 10% level).
For comparison, likelihood ratio tests when adding either αi to (βi ,κi), or βi to
(αi ,κi), improves the fit at the 5% level for 20 and 26 individuals, respectively
(at the 10% level, for 25 (αi) and 37 (βi) individuals). Hence, in terms of value
added at the individual level, all three preference parameters are in roughly
the same ballpark.
A more general approach is to consider all models that are nested in (1)
and apply standard information criteria. We use both the Bayesian informa-
tion criterion (BIC) and Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), each of which is
based on the log-likelihoods and adds a penalty for each parameter. The lower
score, the better fit. More precisely, the criteria are:
BIC = −2ln(L) + d ln(18), (20)
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and
AIC = −2ln(L) + 2d, (21)
where ln(18) in (20) comes from the 18 observations per subject. Since ln18 ≈
2.89 > 2, BIC gives a heavier penalty per parameter than AIC.
Table 5 shows the results. The left panel shows which model provides the
best fit according to BIC. For 37 subjects (33.9%) pure self-interest (αi = βi =
κi = 0) has the lowest BIC score. For the remaining 72 subjects, some combi-
nations of social preferences and/or moral concerns improve the model’s fit.
For 23 subjects, (21.1%) pure Homo moralis preferences (αi = βi = 0, κi , 0)
provides the best individual fit. For another 11 subjects, models with κi in
combination with αi and/or βi have the lowest BIC scores. In sum, for 34 sub-
jects (31.2%), the model with the lowest BIC score includes κi . In comparison,
αi and βi are included in the model with the lowest BIC score for 23 subjects
(21.1%) and 35 subjects (32.0%), respectively. The right panel shows the re-
sults from the same exercise, but now applied to AIC. Then the best-fitting
model at the individual level includes the parameter κi for 48 subjects (or
44.0%). Again, a larger number of subjects than for αi (31 subjects, or 28.4%)
and also slightly more subjects than βi (40 subjects, or 36.7%).
5.4.2 Aggregate estimations
We also evaluate the value added of Kantian morality for the finite mixture es-
timations. Table A.6 in Appendix A2 shows estimates for finite mixture mod-
els with only αk and βk (i.e. where κi = 0). For any given number of types,
these fixed mixture estimates give higher ICL scores than the model includ-
ing Kantian morality, indicating that fixed mixture estimates that include the
parameter κi provide a better fit.
5.4.3 Reciprocity vs. Kantian morality
We finally compare the value added of the Kantian morality parameter, to
the value if one were to instead of Kantian morality add reciprocity. For this
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Table 5: Best individual fit
BIC AIC
Parameters Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
αi ,βi ,γi 2 1.8 6 5.5
αi ,βi 7 6.4 6 5.5
αi ,γi 5 4.6 8 7.3
βi ,γi 4 3.7 10 9.2
αi 9 8.3 11 10.1
βi 22 20.2 18 16.5
γi 23 21.1 24 22.0
- 37 33.9 26 23.9
Notes: Entries indicate the number of subjects for whom the specific model pro-
vides the lowest BIC or AIC score respectively. Table based on our ‘core sample’
of 109 subjects.
purpose, we modify the utility function in (1) to replace the Kantian morality
term by a term that represents negative reciprocity as in Charness and Rabin
(2002), which leads to
ui (x,y) =
∑
γ
η(x,y) (γ) ·pii (γ) (22)
−αi ·
∑
γ
η(x,y) (γ) ·max
{
0,piij (γ)−pii (γ)
}
− βi ·
∑
γ
η(x,y) (γ) ·max
{
0,pii (γ)−piij (γ)
}
− δi · q ·
∑
γ
η(x,y) (γ) ·max
{
0,piij (γ)−pii (γ)
}
,
where q = 1 if the other player ‘misbehaved’ and q = 0 otherwise. Following
Charness and Rabin (2002), we label a first-mover action as misbehavior if it
excludes an outcome that has maximal joint monetary payoffs. For our case
this means that defecting as a first mover in a SPD protocol (if 2R > T + S,
which holds for 5 out of 6 SPDs), and not investing in a TG protocol consti-
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tutes misbehavior (note, however, that the δi term cancels in latter case, as not
investing will lead to equal payoffs for both players). In addition, we also label
not proposing an equal split in the UGs as misbehavior.
In Table A.7 in Appendix A2 we provide the results of finite mixture mod-
els based on (22). The 3-types model has the lowest ICL score among the
reciprocity models. Based on the ICL score, the 3-types reciprocity model per-
forms better than the mixture models with only αk and βk (see A.6). This shows
that, adding reciprocity improves the fit of the model. Importantly however,
the 3-types model that allows for Kantian morality instead of reciprocity has
an even lower ICL score, suggesting that Kantian morality adds more than
reciprocity in our setting.
6 Concluding discussion
In this paper, we report results from a laboratory experiment designed to eval-
uate the explanatory power of Kantian morality in standard strategic interac-
tions. To distinguish Kantian morality from other social concerns, we posit
a general utility function that nests several much studied preference classes,
such as pure self-interest, altruism, spite, and inequity aversion, and of course
Kantian morality. We structurally estimate the preference parameters of this
utility function, allowing for risk aversion and controlling for the beliefs about
opponent’s play. We obtain both individual and aggregate estimates, where
the latter consists of estimating the parameters for a representative agent, as
well as identifying a small number of endogenously determined “preference
types”.
The individual estimates suggest substantial heterogeneity. This hetero-
geneity limits the usefulness of a representative agent approach, However, we
find that the subjects’ behaviors are well captured by models with two or three
preference types. The 2-types model suggests that a bit more than two thirds
of the subjects display a combination of inequity aversion with Kantian moral-
ity, and the remaining third a combination of Kantian morality and behind-
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ness aversion (and indifference towards advantageous inequity). Within the
3-types model, the inequity averse and Kantian moral type still represents a
little less than one third of the subjects. However, now there is another type
which displays only Kantian morality, while the remaining 40% of the subjects
appear to combine spite with Kantian morality. Quite remarkably, all the pref-
erence types—both the representative agent and the preference types within
the 2-types and the 3-types model—have an estimated Kantian morality pa-
rameter κk of around 0.2.
Our experimental design was motivated by findings in the theoretical liter-
ature that investigates the evolutionary foundations of preferences in strategic
interactions (see Alger & Weibull, 2019, for a recent survey). This literature
shows that evolution by natural selection favors Kantian morality (see, in par-
ticular, Bergstrom (1995) and Alger and Weibull (2013)). As it turns out, our
results are in fact in line with an even more recent contribution to this theo-
retical literature. In a model that enables analysis of the long-run impact of
population structure on preferences, Alger et al. (2019) show that preferences
that combine Kantian morality with either altruism or spite are favored by
evolution by natural selection.15
Compared with other experimental studies with structural preference es-
timations, our results agree with those of Bruhin et al. (2018) in that their
behavioral data is largely consistent with there being a small number of “pref-
erence types”. Our findings further agree with Bruhin et al. (2018) in that they
do not either find evidence that the purely selfish Homo oeconomicus explains
their behavioral data. A more detailed comparison is more involved, since
their experimental design differs from ours, and they do not include Kantian
morality. Our results further agree broadly with those in the horse race study
15This result does not contradict that of Alger and Weibull (2013), which is shown by Alger
et al. (2019) to also hold in their model when preferences are expressed with respect to ef-
fects of behavior on own and others’ fitness. The result by Alger et al. (2019) that preferences
favored by natural selection combine Kantian morality with either altruism or spite was ob-
tained for preferences expressed with respect to effects of behavior on own and others’ material
payoffs (even marginal such effects).
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by Miettinen et al. (2019).
As for all laboratory experiments, establishing external validity would be
highly desirable (Levitt & List, 2007). It would further be interesting to ex-
amine whether results similar to ours also obtain in a representative sam-
ple, along the lines of the studies by Bellemare et al. (2008) and Cettolin and
Suetens (2018). Also, while our experiment was conducted on a WEIRD pop-
ulation (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), evolutionary theory suggests
that the qualitative nature of preferences guiding behavior in strategic inter-
actions should be similar across the world, although certain differences be-
tween populations may be expected to influence the relative importance of
self-interest, social concerns, and Kantian morality. In particular, since evolu-
tionary theory suggests that migration patterns and the involvement in inter-
group conflict are expected to impact preferences guiding behavior in strate-
gic interactions (Alger et al., 2019; Choi & Bowles, 2007), this theory delivers
testable predictions that may help explain cross-cultural differences (Falk et
al., 2018) and also perhaps differences between men and women (Croson &
Gneezy, 2009).
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Appendices (For Online Publication)
Appendix A1 DistinguishingKantianmorality from
social preferences
The Ultimatum Game protocol having been analyzed in detail in the main text
(Subsection 3.2), we here analyze the other two game protocols. Throughout
we assume risk neutrality; this is only for notational simplicity, the only dif-
ference being that the monetary payoffs would be replaced by the associated
monetary utilities.
In the Trust Game protocol (Figure 1b), a behavior strategy is a vector x =
(x1,x2) ∈ X = [0,1]2, where x1 is the probability with which the player trusts
the receiver, and x2 the probability with which he honors trust (if the sender
trusts him).16 Then the expected utility (as defined in (1)) from playing x =
(x1,x2) against y = (y1, y2) is (omitting the factor 1/2):
ui (x,y) = (1−κi)[x1 [y2R+ (1− y2)S] + (1− x1)P ] (23)
+ (1−κi)[y1 [x2R+ (1− x2)T ] + (1− y1)P ]
+κi {x1 [x2R+ (1− x2)S] + (1− x1)P }
+κi {x1 [x2R+ (1− x2)T ] + (1− x1)P }
− [αix1 (1− y2) + βiy1 (1− x2)] (T − S) .
Hence, for a subject who believes that the opponent plays yˆ:
∂ui (x, yˆ)
∂x1
= (1−κi)[S−P+yˆ2 (R− S)]+κi [x2 (2R− S − T ) + S + T ]−αi (1− yˆ2) (T − S) ,
(24)
and
∂ui (x, yˆ)
∂x2
= (1−κi)yˆ1 (R− T ) +κix1 (2R− S − T ) + βi yˆ1 (T − S) . (25)
The social preference parameters αi and βi represent consequentialistic mo-
tives: they give weight to the monetary payoff consequences given what the
16Since each player has only one decision node, the distinction between mixed and behav-
ioral strategies is immaterial.
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subject believes about the opponent’s actual play. By contrast, the Kantian
morality parameter κi captures a deontological motive, such as “duty” or “to
do the right thing”, which ((following Alger & Weibull, 2013) we take to be
to evaluate one’s strategy in the light of what would happen if, hypothetically,
the opponent would also use the same strategy.
Turning now to the Sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma game protocol (as in
Figure 1a), denote by x1 the probability of playing C when moving first, x2 the
probability of playing C when moving second after play of C by the opponent,
and and x3 the probability of playing C when moving second after play of D
by the opponent. Hence, the vector x = (x1,x2,x3) ∈ [0,1]3 is the player’s behav-
ior strategy in the symmetrically randomized sequential prisoners’ dilemma.
Then the expected utility (as defined in (1)) from playing x = (x1,x2,x3) against
y = (y1, y2, y3) is (again omitting the factor 1/2):
ui (x,y) = (1−κi)[x1y2R+ x1 (1− y2)S + (1− x1)y3T + (1− x1) (1− y3)P ](26)
+ (1−κi)[y1x2R+ y1 (1− x2)T + (1− y1)x3S + (1− y1) (1− x3)P ]
+κi [x1x2R+ x1 (1− x2)S + (1− x1)x3T + (1− x1) (1− x3)P ]
+κi [x1x2R+ x1 (1− x2)T + (1− x1)x3S + (1− x1) (1− x3)P ]
−αi [x1 (1− y2) + (1− y1)x3] (T − S)
− βi [(1− x1)y3 + y1 (1− x2)] (T − S) .
Hence, for a subject who believes that the opponent would play yˆ one obtains:
∂ui (x, yˆ)
∂x1
= (1−κi)[S − P + yˆ2 (R− S)− yˆ3 (T − P )] (27)
+κi [x2 (2R− S − T ) + (1− x3) (S + T − 2P )]
+ βi yˆ3 (T − S)−αi (1− yˆ2) (T − S) ,
∂ui (x, yˆ)
∂x2
= (1−κi)yˆ1 (R− T ) +κix1 (2R− S − T ) + βi yˆ1 (T − S) , (28)
and
∂ui (x, yˆ)
∂x3
= (1−κi) (1− yˆ1) (S − P ) +κi (1− x1) (T + S − 2P )−αi (1− yˆ1) (T − S) .
(29)
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Again, these equations show that an individual with a Kantian moral concern
(κi > 0) is not only influenced by his belief about the opponent’s strategy, but
also by what he would himself do at every decision node of the game tree.
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Appendix A2 Additional tables
Table A.1: Game protocols: monetary payoffs, actions and beliefs
No. T R P S x1 x2 x3 y1 y2 y3
Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemmas
1 90 45 15 10 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.33 0.20 0.13
2 90 55 20 10 0.24 0.20 0.06 0.30 0.21 0.07
3 80 65 25 20 0.35 0.29 0.13 0.32 0.30 0.16
4 90 65 25 10 0.29 0.31 0.03 0.31 0.25 0.08
5 80 75 30 20 0.43 0.50 0.04 0.40 0.41 0.11
6 90 75 30 10 0.30 0.40 0.01 0.33 0.33 0.08
Trust Games
7 80 50 30 20 0.44 0.27 . 0.41 0.23 .
8 90 50 30 10 0.18 0.18 . 0.33 0.19 .
9 80 60 30 20 0.56 0.35 . 0.47 0.30 .
10 90 60 30 10 0.35 0.25 . 0.37 0.24 .
11 80 70 30 20 0.62 0.51 . 0.54 0.42 .
12 90 70 30 10 0.46 0.40 . 0.42 0.31 .
Ultimatum Games
13 60 50 40 10 0.49 0.96 . 0.48 0.91 .
14 65 50 35 10 0.52 0.96 . 0.49 0.88 .
15 70 50 30 10 0.46 0.96 . 0.47 0.87 .
16 75 50 25 10 0.43 0.90 . 0.47 0.83 .
17 80 50 20 10 0.60 0.88 . 0.51 0.79 .
18 85 50 15 10 0.60 0.81 . 0.55 0.72 .
Notes: Here x1, x2 and x3 denote action frequencies. In the SPDs, x1 is the fre-
quency by which the first mover plays C, x2 the frequency by which the second
mover plays C after C, and x3 the frequency by which she plays C afterD. In the
TGs, x1 is the frequency by which the first mover plays I , and x2 the frequency
by which the second mover plays G after I . For the UGs, x1 is the frequency by
which the first mover plays E, and x2 the frequency by which the second mover
plays A after U . Likewise, y1, y2 and y3 are the mean values of the stated beliefs
about x1, x2 and x3. Table based on all 136 subjects.
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Table A.2: Lottery choices
Outcomes
Lottery A B Frequency Percentage ri
Sessions 2-8
1 18 18 50 43.9% 1.61
2 22 15 24 21.1% 1.00
3 26 12 18 15.8% 0.39
4 30 9 3 2.6% 0.25
5 34 6 8 7.0% 0.08
6 37 2 11 9.7% -0.09
Session 1
1 18 18 5 22.7% 4.71
2 22 16 3 13.6% 2.95
3 26 14 6 27.3% 1.19
4 30 12 4 18.2% 0.77
5 34 10 2 9.1% 0.32
6 40 4 2 9.1% -0.13
Notes: Lottery choices in the Eckel and Grossman (2002) risk elicitation task.
‘Outcomes’ are the payoffs denoted in “points”, see Appendix A3 for the in-
structions. The final column lists the implied ri parameters for each lottery
choice. Note that after the first session, we slightly adjusted the outcomes to
better estimate ri . Table based on all 136 subjects.
Table A.3: Individual parameter estimates (all subjects)
Parameter Median Mean S.D. Min Max
αi 0.17 599.72 5938.54 −0.89 68186.74
βi −0.11 50.30 697.75 −496.78 8105.22
κi 0.20 189.62 2200.83 −0.29 25666.71
Notes: Table based on estimates from all 136 subjects.
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Table A.4: The 4-types model
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
αk 0.04 0.15 0.25 0.09
(0.08) (0.19) (0.05) (0.02)
βk 0.30 −0.15 −0.28 0.19
(0.07) (0.24) (0.14) (0.05)
κk 0.25 0.26 0.17 0.15
(0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
λk 0.45 0.01 0.19 12.67
(0.10) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02)
ρk 0.79 2.11 0.89 −0.13
(0.11) (0.36) (0.21) (0.06)
φk 0.19 0.23 0.33 0.24
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
lnL -2099.9
EN (τ ) 20.64
ICL 4328.3
NEC 0.088
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation results from models with 1, 2
and 3 types can be found in Table 3. Based on our ‘core sample’ of 109 subjects.
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Table A.5: Estimates at the aggregate level (all subjects)
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
αk 0.15 0.08 0.31 0.08 0.06 0.21
(0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.14) (0.04) (0.12)
βk 0.01 0.12 −0.63 −0.17 0.29 −0.31
(0.03) (0.03) (0.40) (0.24) (0.06) (0.36)
κk 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.15
(0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
λk 0.31 0.35 0.06 0.04 1.20 0.28
(0.10) (0.13) (0.08) (0.21) (0.38) (0.11)
rk 0.94 0.94 1.39 1.68 0.51 0.77
(0.10) (0.11) (0.36) (0.75) (0.15) (0.39)
φk 1.00 0.60 0.40 0.42 0.25 0.33
(-) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04)
lnL -2897.5 -2633.9 -2583.5
EN (τ ) 0.00 5.17 16.65
ICL 5819.6 5327.1 5267.2
NEC - 0.020 0.053
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Table based on all 136 subjects.
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Table A.6: Estimates at the aggregate level (without morality)
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
αk 0.00 −0.05 0.11 −0.07 0.12 −0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
βk 0.22 0.35 −0.44 0.19 −0.43 0.52
(0.04) (0.03) (0.16) (0.22) (0.20) (0.04)
λk 0.76 1.46 0.04 1.54 0.05 1.56
(0.24) (0.57) (0.09) (0.90) (0.09) (0.70)
rk 0.66 0.48 1.45 0.48 1.41 0.42
(0.11) (0.10) (0.33) (0.73) (0.40) (0.15)
φk 1.00 0.63 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.29
(-) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
lnL -2414.0 -2229.1 -2198.7
EN (τ ) 0.00 4.41 16.40
ICL 4846.8 4504.9 4479.4
NEC - 0.024 0.074
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Based on our ‘core sample’ of 109 sub-
jects.
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Table A.7: Estimates at the aggregate level (reciprocity)
1 type 2 types 3 types
Rep. agent Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
αk −0.08 −0.19 0.11 −0.13 0.13 −0.49
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
βk 0.17 0.27 −0.49 0.46 0.03 −0.32
(0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
δk 0.17 0.27 0.02 0.13 −0.12 1.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07)
λk 0.37 0.36 0.04 1.73 2.10 0.00
(0.15) (0.26) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.00)
rk 0.87 0.90 1.51 0.40 0.15 2.74
(0.13) (0.15) (0.32) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
φk 1.00 0.64 0.36 0.35 0.31 0.34
(-) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
lnL -2393.9 -2197.6 -2149.7
EN (τ ) 0.00 3.52 15.57
ICL 4811.2 4450.3 4394.7
NEC - 0.018 0.064
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Based on our ‘core sample’ of 109 sub-
jects.
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Appendix A3 Experimental instructions
Welcome
Welcome to this experiment. All subjects receive the same instructions.
Please read them carefully.
Do not communicate with any of the other subjects during the entire ex-
periment. If you have any questions, raise your hand and wait until one of us
comes to you to answer your question in private.
During the experiment you will receive points. These points are worth
money. How many points (and hence how much money) you get depends on
your own decisions, the decisions of others, and chance. At the end of the
experiment the points that you got will be converted to euros and the amount
will be paid to you privately, in cash.
Every point is equivalent to 0.17 euro.
Your decisions are anonymous. They will not be linked to your name in
any way. Other subjects can never trace your decisions back to you.
Today’s experiment consists of two parts. At the beginning of each part,
you will receive new instructions. Your decisions made in one part will never
affect outcomes in another part, so you can treat both parts as independent.
Decision situations I
In this part, you will participate in 18 different decision situations. For
each decision situation, you will be randomly paired with someone else in the
lab. Therefore, in each decision situation you will (most likely) be paired with
a different subject than in the previous situation. You will never learn with
whom you are paired.
The 18 decision situations will all be different, but they all involve two
persons, and in all the decision situations one person is assigned to Role A
(person A) while the other is assigned to Role B (person B). There are then two
kinds of situations, as depicted in Figures 1 (below) and Figure 2 (on the next
page).
In the situation shown in Figure 1, person A first chooses LEFT or RIGHT.
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If A chooses LEFT, person B has to choose between WEST or SOUTH. If person
A chooses RIGHT, person B has to choose between NORTH and EAST.
The choices of A and B jointly determine the number of points for A and B
as follows:
• If A chooses LEFT and B chooses WEST, A gets WA points and B gets WB
points
• If A chooses LEFT and B chooses SOUTH, A gets SA points and B gets SB
points
• If A chooses RIGHT and B chooses NORTH, A gets NA points and B gets
NB points
• If A chooses RIGHT and B chooses EAST, A gets EA points and B gets EB
points
The values of WA, WB, SA, SB, NA, NB, EA and EB vary from one decision
situation to another. At the beginning of each decision situation, you and all
others in the lab will be informed of the values.
Decision situations II
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In the decision situation shown in Figure 2, person A first chooses LEFT
or RIGHT. If A chooses LEFT, person B has no choice to make. If A chooses
RIGHT, B has to choose between NORTH and EAST.
The choices of A and B jointly determine the number of points for A and B
as follows:
• If A chooses LEFT, A gets LA points and B gets LB points
• If A chooses RIGHT and B chooses NORTH, A gets NA points and B gets
NB points
• If A chooses RIGHT and B chooses EAST, A gets EA points and B gets EB
points
The values of LA, LB, NA, NB, EA and EB vary from one decision situation
to another. At the beginning of each decision situation, you and all others in
the lab will be informed of the values.
Example
The figure below gives an example of a decision situation. This decision sit-
uation is randomly selected. Remember that each of the 18 decision situations
will be different.
In this example:
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• If A chooses LEFT and B chooses WEST, A gets 80 points and B gets 20
points
• If A chooses LEFT and B chooses SOUTH, A gets 30 points and B gets 30
points
• If A chooses RIGHT and B chooses NORTH, A gets 75 points and B gets
75 points
• If A chooses RIGHT and B chooses EAST, A gets 20 points and B gets 80
points
If you want to see another example, click here
Decisions and payments
You will see 18 different decision situations. For each decision situation,
you will be asked two things.
First, we will ask you what you want to do in Role A and what you want to
do in Role B.
Second, we will ask you to guess what the others in the lab will do in Role
A and what they will do in Role B. Specifically, we will ask you to guess:
• What percentage of the other people in the lab choose LEFT and what
percentage choose RIGHT when in Role A
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• What percentage of the other people in the lab choose WEST and what
percentage choose SOUTH when facing that choice in Role B
• What percentage of the other people in the lab choose NORTH and what
percentage choose EAST when facing that choice in Role B.
Both your decisions and your guesses will determine how many euros you
get at the end of the experiment. Specifically, at the end of today’s experiment,
two of the 18 decision situations will be randomly selected for payment: for
one of these situations you get points from the decisions, while for the other
situation you get points from your guesses. The same two decision situations
will be selected for everyone in the lab. Your decisions
For one decision situation you and the others in the lab get points from the
decisions. For this situation, either you or the person you are paired with is
assigned to Role A, while the other is assigned to Role B, with equal probability
for each case. The number of points you and this other person get is then
determined by your decision in the role to which you were assigned and the
decision of the other person in the role to which (s)he was assigned.
Note that it is equally likely that your choices in role A or role B count.
Think about flipping a coin: if heads comes up you will be in role A and if
tails comes up you will be in role B. When you make your decisions, you do
not know which role you have and you should therefore make decisions as if
each role could determine the outcome, which is the case. Your guesses
For another decision situation you and the others in the lab get points from
the guesses. You get more points the closer your guesses are to what the others
actually choose in both roles A and B. One of the guesses that you make in this
situation will be randomly selected for payment. Specifically, you get between
0 and 50 points depending on the accuracy of your guess. If you want to earn
as much as possible with your guesses, you should simply answer with what
you really think is the most likely answer to each question. Your guesses do
not have any impact on the number of points that the others in the lab get.
If you want to see how your earnings are calculated you can click here.
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Decision screens
Below you can see and try the decision screens. First, you will see the screen
where you will be asked for a decision in a decision situation. If you make a
decision, you will be taken to the screen where you will be asked for a guess
about what others will do.
In the examples below, all decision situations are chosen randomly. You
can try the decision screens as often as you want.
Show example
Quiz questions I
Please answer the following quiz questions. If you have any questions please
raise your hand.
The 18 decision situations:
O are always the same
O are sometimes the same
O are always different
51
The figure shows a possible decision situation. The figure merely serves as an
example, the decision situation has been selected randomly.
Suppose A chooses LEFT and B chooses SOUTH and EAST. How much would
A and B earn?
A would earn: points B would earn: points
Suppose A chooses RIGHT and B chooses WEST and NORTH. How much
would A and B earn?
A would earn: points B would earn: points
Quiz questions II
Please answer the following quiz questions. If you have any questions please
raise your hand.
In each decision situation:
O you will have the same role (A or B)
O it is equally likely that you will be in role A or B
In each decision situation:
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O you will be paired with the same subject
O you will be paired with a randomly determined subject
The figure shows a possible decision situation. The figure merely serves as an
example, the decision situation has been selected randomly.
Suppose A chooses LEFT and B chooses NORTH. How much would A earn?
A would earn: points B would earn: points
Suppose A chooses RIGHT and B chooses EAST. How much would B earn?
A would earn: points B would earn: points
End of instructions
You have reached the end of the instructions. You can still go back by using
the menu above. If you are ready, click on ’continue’ below. If you need help,
please raise your hand.
As soon as everyone has finished with instructions the experiment will
start. During the experiment, you can take as much time as you need for each
decision situation.
Part II
In this part you choose one of the six options listed below. You choose
by clicking on the option you prefer. Each option has two possible outcomes
(Outcome A or Outcome B) that are equally likely to occur. Think about the
flip of a coin: heads (Outcome A) and tails (Outcome B) are equally likely.
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select Outcome
A or Outcome B. You will receive the number of points corresponding to the
option you chose. For example: If you choose option 4 you will receive 30
points if Outcome A is selected by the computer and 9 points if Outcome B is
selected by the computer.
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